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FINDING FACTS BUT MISSING THE LAW: THE GOLDSTONE REPORT,
GAZA AND LAWFARE
Laurie R. Blank*
Civilian deaths in Gaza often produce immediate conclusions of
Israeli war crimes and other violations of international law. We now see
similar statements in the aftermath of U.S. or allied attacks resulting in civilian deaths in Afghanistan. The increasing use of law as a tool of war—a
practice termed ―lawfare‖—offers a likely and potentially disturbing explanation for the attempts to fashion every civilian death caused by a regular
military as a war crime. As military forces find themselves increasingly
under attack for alleged violations of IHL in conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Gaza, Lebanon and elsewhere, one crucial contributing factor is the manipulation of international law—the very principles enshrined in the Geneva
Conventions and customary law—to create an appearance of war crimes
and other atrocities being committed by the United States and Israel in particular.
This article will explore these developments through the lens of the
Goldstone Report, the report of the U.N. fact-finding mission tasked with
investigating alleged violations of IHL and human rights in the 2008–2009
war in Gaza. It will examine how the Goldstone Report contributes to—
even puts a stamp of approval on—the use of lawfare. In particular, this
article will examine how the misapplication of IHL in the Goldstone Report
exacerbates the manipulation of IHL by insurgents and terrorists, who use
the law, and Western militaries’ adherence to the law, as a tool of war in
today’s conflicts. Key areas include perfidy, military objectives and the
targeting of protected objects, and the defending party’s obligations to take
precautions to protect the civilian population. The Goldstone Report’s approach to IHL, if followed, would facilitate and encourage such manipulation of the law and, rather than leading to greater protection for civilians,
actually produce conflict scenarios where civilians are at ever greater risk.
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Civilian deaths in Gaza—whether during Operation Cast Lead, the
May 31 flotilla incident, or other incidents—seem to produce immediate
conclusions regarding Israeli war crimes and other violations of international law. Recently, we have seen similar statements in the aftermath of U.S. or
allied attacks leading to civilian deaths in Afghanistan. International law
recognizes, indeed accepts, that civilians will die during war, and yet we
now see a growing trend in which every civilian death necessarily seems to
connote a crime. Neither the growing public awareness of international law
nor the twenty-four hour news cycle can fully explain this phenomenon.
Instead, the increasing use of law as a tool of war, a practice termed
―lawfare,‖ offers a more likely and more disturbing explanation for the attempts to fashion every civilian death caused by a regular military as a war
crime.1 International humanitarian law (IHL), otherwise known as the law
of armed conflict or the laws of war, governs the conduct of both states and
individuals during armed conflict and seeks to minimize suffering in war by
protecting persons not participating in hostilities and by restricting the
means and methods of warfare.2 IHL contains extensive provisions requir1
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts (Carr Center for Human Rights, John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov‘t,
Harvard U., Working Paper, 2001), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web
%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf.
2
See International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law in
Brief, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_in_brief (last visited Oct.
10, 2010). The law of armed conflict is set forth primarily in the four Geneva Conventions of
August 14, 1949 and their Additional Protocols. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362 [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363 [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No.
3364 [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365 [hereinafter GC IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted by Conference June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3ae6b36b4.pdf
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ing protection of civilians and proscribing attacks that target civilians and
indiscriminate attacks. These provisions form part of the legal doctrine of
militaries around the world, including those of the United States, United
Kingdom, Israel, and other Western allies.3 And yet these militaries find
themselves increasingly under attack for alleged violations of IHL in conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Gaza, Lebanon, and elsewhere. Politics play a
role in these developments, naturally, but one crucial contributing factor is
the manipulation of international law—the very principles enshrined in the
Geneva Conventions and the above-mentioned military manuals—to create
an appearance of war crimes and other atrocities being committed by the
United States and Israel in particular.
This article will explore these developments through the lens of the
Goldstone Report, the report of the U.N. fact-finding mission tasked with
investigating alleged violations of IHL and human rights in the 2008–2009
war in Gaza.4 The Goldstone Report presented an opportunity to examine
critically how the law applies in complicated modern warfare and might be
used to solve difficult problems such conflict poses. Mandated to investigate
possible violations of IHL and human rights law during the conflict in Gaza,
the Goldstone Report engages in a sweeping review of the conflict, as well
as the historical underpinnings of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, human
rights in the West Bank and in Israel proper, and Israel‘s strategic aims.
This article will not engage in a thorough discussion of the report‘s mandate
or the shortcomings in the report‘s application of IHL and human rights

[hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II),
adopted by Conference June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3ae6b37f40.pdf [hereinafter AP II].
3
See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27–
10: LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956), available at www.aschq.army.mil/supportingdocs/Fm27
_10.pdf; UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT–
AMENDED TEXT (2004), available at www.mod.uk/aboutus/laws_and_regs/lawmanual/index.
html; OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS (1992), available at http://www.cfd-cdf.forces.gc.ca/
websites/Resources/dgfda/Pubs/CF%20Joint%20Doctrine%20Publications/CF%20Joint%20
Doctrine%20-%20B-GJ-005-104%20FP-021%20-%20LOAC%20-%20EN%20(13%20Aug
%2001).pdf; AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PUBLICATION, INFORMATION OPERATIONS
PLANNING MANUAL (1994), available at http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/dcdm.
pdf; THE STATE OF ISRAEL, THE OPERATION IN GAZA 27 DECEMBER 2008–18 JANUARY 2009
(2009), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/E89E699D-A435-491B-B2D0017675DAFEF7/0/GazaOperation.pdf.
4
See generally Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied
Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict,
A/HRC/12/48, Sept. 15, 2009, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/
specialsession/9/docs/UNFFMGC_Report.pdf, [hereinafter ―Goldstone Report‖].
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law.5 Rather, it will examine how the Goldstone Report contributes to—
even puts a stamp of approval on—the use of lawfare. In particular, this
article will examine how the misapplication of IHL in the Goldstone Report
exacerbates the manipulation of IHL by insurgents and terrorists, who use
the law, and Western militaries‘ adherence to the law, as a tool of war in
today‘s conflicts. The Goldstone Report‘s approach to IHL, if followed,
would facilitate and encourage such manipulation of the law and, rather
than leading to greater protection for civilians, actually produce conflict
scenarios where civilians are at ever-greater risk.
Section I will provide an overview of the concept of lawfare and the
nature of warfare in asymmetrical conflicts, and will also briefly examine
the key principle of IHL at issue in this analysis, the principle of distinction.
Section II will discuss the shortcomings in the Goldstone Report‘s application of IHL and will demonstrate how those errors will actually exacerbate
the use of lawfare and greatly undermine IHL‘s fundamental protections for
civilians and civilian objects during armed conflict. Finally, Section III will
explore what these challenges mean for the future, given the continuing
trend of complex conflicts between state and non-state actors.
I. LAWFARE, ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICTS AND IHL
A.

Lawfare

Lawfare is generally defined as ―the strategy of using or misusing
law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve military objectives.‖6 The term was first popularized in a 2002 article by Major General
Charles Dunlap, in which he explained:
Lawfare describes a method of warfare where law is used as a means of
realizing a military objective. Though at first blush one might assume lawfare would result in less suffering in war (and sometimes it does), in practice it too often produces behavior that jeopardizes the protection of the
truly innocent. There are many dimensions to lawfare, but the one increasingly embraced by U.S. opponents is a cynical manipulation of the rule of
law and the humanitarian values it represents. Rather than seeking battlefield victories, per se, challengers try to destroy the will to fight by undermining the public support that is indispensable when democracies like the
U.S. conduct military interventions. A principal way of bringing about that

5
See Laurie R. Blank, The Application of IHL in the Goldstone Report: A Critical Commentary, 12 Y. B. INT‘L HUM. L. 347–402 (2009) (discussing the application of IHL in the
Goldstone Report).
6
See Colonel Kelly D. Wheaton, ―Strategic Lawyering‖ Realizing the Potential of Military Lawyers at the Strategic Level, 2006 ARMY LAW. 1, 6 (2006).
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end is to make it appear that the U.S. is waging war in violation of the letter or spirit of LOAC.7

Two aspects of lawfare are relevant to the instant discussion: strategic and
tactical. The above description of lawfare highlights the strategic aspect, in
which technologically and militarily disadvantaged forces target public support and seek to force a political end to the fighting because of opposition to
a seemingly extra-legal war.8 The tactical piece occurs when the disadvantaged side—insurgents, terrorists, etcetera—openly violate the law of war to
gain a tactical advantage in specific operations by handicapping the ability
of the IHL-compliant military to carry out its mission within the bounds of
the law.
The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan abound with examples of this
type of tactical lawfare. Storing munitions in mosques or hospitals, launching rockets from residential compounds, and generally fighting from within
the civilian population without any distinguishing markings all create situations where an IHL-compliant military often appears forced to choose between engaging a legitimate target and endangering civilians. For example,
Taliban militants have stored heavy weaponry in mosques and reportedly
positioned two large anti-aircraft guns in front of the office of a major international humanitarian aid organization.9 ―By shifting soldiers and military
equipment into civilian neighborhoods and taking refuge in mosques, archeological sites and other nonmilitary facilities, Taliban forces are confronting U.S. authorities with the choice of risking civilian casualties and destruction of treasured Afghan assets or forgoing attacks.‖10 Similarly, U.S.
and allied forces in Iraq encountered multiple examples of insurgents using
civilians as human shields, attacking from locations protected under IHL,
fighting without wearing a uniform or other distinctive sign, and using protected places for weapons storage and command posts.11 Operation Desert
7

Dunlap, supra note 1.
See, e.g., W. MICHAEL REISMAN & CHRIS ANTONIOU, THE LAWS OF WAR xxiv (1994)
(explaining that ―[i]n modern popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict requires a
substantial base of public support. That support can erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no
matter how worthy the political objective, if people believe that the war is being conducted in
an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way.‖) (emphasis added).
9
See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti & Kevin Whitelaw, Into the Thick of Things, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Nov. 5, 2001, at 24 (―Heavy weaponry is being sheltered in several mosques to
deter attacks. The Taliban has even placed a tank and two large antiaircraft guns under trees
in front of the office of CARE International . . . .‖).
10
Bradley Graham & Vernon Loeb, Taliban Dispersal Slows U.S., WASH. POST, Nov. 6,
2001, at A1.
11
See Dexter Filkins, In Taking Falluja Mosque, Victory By the Inch, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
27, 2004, at A1; Tony Perry & Rick Loomis, Mosque Targeted in Fallouja Fighting, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2004, at A1; Coalition Forces Continue Advance Toward Baghdad (CNN
television broadcast Mar. 24, 2003) (transcript available at http://archives.cnn.com/
8
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Storm involved similar attempts to manipulate U.S. law of war compliance.
As the United States explained in a communication to the United Nations at
the time, the Iraqis
[M]oved significant amounts of military weapons and equipment into civilian areas with the deliberate purpose of using innocent civilians and their
homes as shields against attacks on legitimate military targets; [and] Iraqi
fighter and bomber aircraft were dispersed into villages near military airfields where they were parked between civilian houses and even placed
immediately adjacent to important archaeological sites and historic treasures.12

Operation Cast Lead, the Israeli military operation in Gaza in 2008–2009,
faced the same challenges: Palestinian militants hid or stored rockets, missiles, and other munitions in mosques, hospitals, schools, and other civilian
buildings.13
All of these examples of lawfare impact the fundamental IHL principle of distinction, discussed below. Thus, ―the most typical and also most
damaging form of lawfare in recent conflicts has been the decision of disadvantaged combatants to not distinguish themselves from the local populace.‖14 By hiding amongst otherwise protected persons and objects, such
fighters take advantage of the more advantaged military‘s compliance with
IHL principles and obligations, using both the law and the presence of civilian persons and objects as a tactical weapon.
B.

The Principle of Distinction

The principle of distinction, one of the ―cardinal principles of
IHL,‖15 requires that any party to a conflict distinguish between those who

TRANSCRIPTS/0303/24/se.17.html); The Rules of War are Foreign to Saddam, OTTAWA
CITIZEN, Mar. 25, 2003; David Blair, Human Shields Disillusioned with Saddam, Leave Iraq
after Dubious Postings, NATIONAL POST (Canada), Mar. 4, 2003, available at
http://www.FPinfomart.ca.
12
Letter dated March 5, 1991 from the Permanent Rep. of United States of America to the
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/22341 (Mar.
8, 1991).
13
ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, THE ―GAZA WAR‖: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 24, Center for
Strategic & International Studies (Feb. 2, 2009) (describing how Hamas used a mosque to
store Grad missiles and Qassam rockets), available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/
090202_gaza_war.pdf; Jeffrey Fleishman, Charges Fly in Battle Over What Happened in
Gaza, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at A1 (detailing how Hamas used a bunker beneath a hospital as a headquarters).
14
Eric Talbot Jensen, The ICJ’s ―Uganda Wall‖: A Barrier to the Principle of Distinction
and An Entry Point for Lawfare, 35 DENV. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 241, 270 (2007).
15
Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons] (Higgins, J. dissenting on
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are fighting and those who are not and direct attacks solely at the former. 16
Similarly, parties must distinguish between civilian objects and military
objects and target only the latter. Article 48 of Additional Protocol I sets
forth the basic rule:
[I]n order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population
and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations
only against military objectives.17

Distinction lies at the core of IHL‘s seminal goal of protecting innocent civilians and persons who are hors de combat. This purpose is emphasized in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I, which states that ―[t]he civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.‖18 The obligation to distinguish forms part of the customary
international law of both international and non-international armed conflicts, as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) held in the Tadic case.19 As a result, all parties to any conflict are
unrelated grounds) (declaring that distinction and the prohibition on unnecessary suffering
are the two cardinal principles of international humanitarian law).
16
Distinction was first set forth in Article 22 of the Lieber Code: ―Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise steadily advanced, especially in
war on land, the distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile country and
the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much
as the exigencies of war will admit.‖ Francis Lieber, War Department, Instructions for the
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field art. 22 (1863), available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/110?OpenDocument [hereinafter Lieber Code]. A few
short years later, the international community reinforced the rule in the St. Petersburg Declaration, which stated that ―the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.‖ Declaration Renouncing
the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, preamble,
Nov. 29 (Dec. 11), 1868, reprinted in 1 AJIL Supp. 95; see also 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS
& LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3 (2005) [hereinafter CIHL] (description of the concept of distinction in Rule 1).
17
Article 48 is considered customary international law. See AP I, supra note 2, art. 48; see
also CIHL, supra note 16, Rule 1.
18
AP I, supra note 2, art. 51(2).
19
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-Tbis-R117, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 110, 127 (citing U.N. General Assembly Resolution
2675: ―Bearing in mind the need for measures to ensure the better protection of human rights
in armed conflicts of all types, [ . . . the General Assembly] Affirms the following basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts, without prejudice to their
future elaboration within the framework of progressive development of the international law
of armed conflict: . . . 2. In the conduct of military operations during armed conflicts, a distinction must be made at all times between persons actively taking part in the hostilities and
civilian populations.‖); See also Nuclear Weapons, supra note 15, ¶ 79 (distinction is one of
the ―intransgressible principles of international customary law‖); CIHL, supra note 16, at 3
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obligated to distinguish between combatants, or fighters, and civilians, and
concomitantly, to distinguish themselves from civilians and their own military objects from civilian objects.
C.

Asymmetrical Conflicts20

Modern warfare is increasingly characterized by asymmetry in the
military capabilities of the parties. ―Wars between powerful states, those
conflicts that prompted the development of humanitarian law, are increasingly rare. Instead of large-scale combat between organized militaries,
modern warfare is becoming asymmetrical.‖21 As such asymmetry grows,
the ―disadvantaged party has an incentive to blur the distinction between its
forces and the civilian population in the hope that this will deter the other
side from attack.‖22
Contemporary conflicts thus pose particular challenges for distinction precisely because of the lack of boundaries between conflict areas and
civilian areas, between those actively participating in hostilities and those
who are not. U.S. and NATO forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have been
wrestling with the difficult legal and moral questions contemporary conflict
raises for nearly a decade and continue to face complicated questions about
who to target, how to target, and when to target. For example, as one news
article explained about combat in Afghanistan:
[T]he elusive insurgents blend easily into the population, invisible to Marines until they pick up a weapon. They use villagers to spot and warn of
U.S. troop movements, take up positions in farmers‘ homes and fields, and
attack Marines from spots with ready escape routes. The Marines, under
strict rules to protect civilians, must wait for insurgents to attack and then
attempt to ensnare them. Limited in their use of airstrikes and artillery—
because of the danger to civilians and because aircraft often frighten the

(Rule 1); Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm‘n H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 178 (1997).
20
Asymmetrical warfare is generally used to describe ―a situation where an adversary can
take advantage of its strengths or an opponent‘s weaknesses.‖ ROGER W. BARNETT,
ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE: TODAY‘S CHALLENGE TO U.S. MILITARY POWER 15 (2003). In
―the modern context, asymmetrical warfare emphasizes what are popularly perceived as
unconventional or nontraditional methodologies.‖ Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., A Virtuous Warrior
in a Savage World, 8 USAFA J. LEG. STUD. 71, 72 (1997).
21
Gabriel Swiney, Saving Lives: The Principle of Distinction and the Realities of Modern
War, 39 INT‘L L. 733, 743 (2005).
22
Michael N. Schmitt, The Impact of High Tech and Low Tech Warfare on Distinction, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE 21ST CENTURY‘S CONFLICTS: CHANGES AND
CHALLENGES 169, 178 (Roberta Arnold & Pierre-Antoine Hildbrand eds., 2005).
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Taliban away—Marine riflemen must use themselves as bait and then engage in the riskier task of pursuing insurgents on foot.23

Similarly, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraqi insurgents commonly wore civilian clothing when approaching American and British
forces in order to get closer without seeming to present a threat.24 Perhaps
most nefariously, insurgent groups that employ suicide bombing as a tactic
have now turned to the use of women and children, for they have proven
more likely to evade measures designed to identify suicide bombers.25 In all
of these situations, when those who are fighting (insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists, or comparable terms) melt into the civilian population and persons
who appear to be civilians periodically engage in hostilities, determining
who is a legitimate target becomes nearly impossible.
Indeed, the great fluidity between hostile persons and innocent civilians and the conscious blending of hostile persons into the civilian population makes a soldier‘s task nearly impossible.26 For example, a soldier manning a checkpoint sees a jeep speeding toward him. It could be civilians
seeking aid or fleeing from danger, or it could be insurgents bent on driving
the vehicle into the checkpoint as a suicide bomb. The soldier who reacts
too soon and fires on the jeep risks killing innocent civilians; the soldier
who waits too long to make a positive identification risks dying in a fiery
explosion.27 Neither choice is acceptable from a tactical or legal standpoint.
Insurgents take advantage of this dilemma every day to gain an edge over
the superior fighting capabilities of state forces. In Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban regularly ―use a tactic of engaging coalition forces from

23

Ann Scott Tyson, In Afghanistan, a Test of Tactics Under Strict Rules to Protect Civilians, Marines Face More Complex Missions, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2009, at A6.
24
Id. See also Official: Afghan Militants Fled Dressed as Women, CNN.COM, July 6, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/07/06/afghanistan.marine.standoff/index.html.
25
See, e.g., Pakistan: Taliban Buying Children for Suicide Attacks, CNN.COM (July 7,
2009), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/07/07/pakistan.child.bombers/index.
html (explaining that ―young suicide bombers may be able to reach targets unnoticed‖);
Cassandra Clifford, The Battle for Suicide Bombers, FOREIGN POL‘Y BLOGS NETWORK, (Jan.
8, 2010), http://children.foreignpolicyblogs.com/category/suicide-bombers/; Child Bombersin-Training Arrested in Iraq, UPI.COM, (April 21, 2009, 11:14 AM), http://www.upi.com/
Top_News/2009/04/21/Child-bombers-in-training-arrested-in-Iraq/UPI-48761240326883/;
Dan Abrams, Turning a Blind Eye to Child Suicide Bombers, MSNBC.COM (March 26, 2004,
11:37:21 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4601244.
26
Laurie R. Blank & Amos N. Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Operationalizing the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV. NAT‘L SEC. J. 45, 65–66 (2010).
27
See, e.g., Suicide Bomber Attacks Afghan Army Base, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2009, at
A10 (describing how a suicide car bomber tried to drive into the army base, was stopped at
the gate and then detonated his explosives at the gate, killing one soldier and wounding five
other people); see also Amos N. Guiora, Teaching Morality in Armed Conflict: The Israel
Defense Forces Model, 18 JEWISH POL. STUD. REV. 1, 3 (2006).
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positions that expose Afghan civilians to danger.‖28 This tactic is designed
to force U.S. troops to either hold their fire in the face of an attack or endanger innocent civilians, a lose-lose situation. By not distinguishing themselves from civilians—thus violating the principle of distinction—these
militants deliberately create such situations.
Israel‘s conflicts, particularly with Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006
and with Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups in Gaza in December
2008—January 2009, offer perhaps the most searing commentary about the
nature of asymmetrical war. Indeed, in the Gaza Strip, ―one of the most
densely populated tracts of land in the world,‖ where militants intermingle
with the civilian population, store munitions in residential buildings, hospitals and mosques, and launch rockets from farmers‘ fields and residential
rooftops, the implementation of IHL faces one of its gravest tests. 29 Israeli
troops, faced with Hamas militants firing from schools, storing munitions in
mosques and using hospitals as command posts, face the same challenging
decisions as U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, rather than examine
critically how the law applies in complicated contemporary conflicts and
how to use the law to solve difficult problems that arise, the Goldstone Report misapplied and misconstrued IHL in ways that only exacerbate the use
of lawfare and threaten the vital goal of protecting civilians in combat
zones.
II. THE GOLDSTONE REPORT‘S CONTRIBUTION TO THE DANGERS OF
LAWFARE
Conflicts that know no differentiation between the traditional battlefield and populated urban areas and pit states against non-state actors create
a natural inclination to focus on the innocent civilian casualties and the civilian infrastructure that endures significant damage. In Gaza, both Hamas
tactics and the urban environment in which most of the relevant military
operations occurred demonstrate how this natural focus can be manipulated
28
Jim Garamone, Directive Re-emphasizes Protecting Afghan Civilians, AM. FORCES
PRESS SERVICE (July 6, 2009), http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123157435; see also
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION TO AFGHANISTAN, HUMAN RIGHTS UNIT MID YEAR
BULLETIN ON PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 35 (2009),
http://unama.unmissions.org/portals/unama/human%20rights/09july31-unama-human-rightscivilian-casualties-mid-year-2009-bulletin.pdf (―In several cases investigated by UNAMA, it
is apparent that important traditional codes of hospitality and power imbalances inhibit the
ability of villagers living in areas with a strong [anti-government element] presence to refuse
shelter to an [anti-government element] commander or his men. Information indicates that
[anti-government elements] take advantage of these factors to use civilian houses as cover, to
deter [pro-government force] raids, or to increase the likelihood of civilian casualties if
raided by [pro-government forces], potentially violating international humanitarian law.‖).
29
Key Maps, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/
v3_israel_palestinians/maps/html/population_settlements.stm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).

File: Blank 2

2010]

Created on: 12/2/2010 5:17:00 PM

Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:04:00 PM

GAZA AND LAWFARE

289

and perverted into a tactic in specific operations and an all too effective
strategy impacting an entire operation. Indeed, the challenges presented in
that conflict are emblematic of some of the most difficult dilemmas asymmetrical warfare poses, dilemmas that place both soldiers and innocent civilians at grave risk every day.
Instead of engaging in a careful and precise analysis of how the law
applies and grappling with these very difficulties, however, the Goldstone
Report seemingly ignores these challenges and applies IHL simplistically,
incorrectly, and in a manner that only encourages the abuse of the law for
tactical and strategic purposes in future conflicts. Three areas of the report
that raise particular concern regarding the use of lawfare are perfidy, the
designation of military objectives and precautions. The report‘s goals appear to be greater protection for civilians during conflict; unfortunately, the
impact of its misapplication of IHL and encouragement of lawfare is that
civilians will consistently be at greater risk as a result.
A.

Perfidy

The traditional definition of perfidy is ―[t]o kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army,‖ as set forth in
Article 23(b) of the 1907 Hague Convention. 30 Suicide bombers disguising
themselves as civilians to gain closer access to military checkpoints or other
locations are a prime example of killing ―treacherously.‖ Article 37(1) of
Additional Protocol I offers a more comprehensive formulation, forbidding
killing, capturing or injuring the enemy ―by resort to perfidy.‖31 In particular, the Protocol states that ―[a]cts inviting the confidence of an adversary to
lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection
under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent
to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy.‖32 Based on notions of
honor, this prohibition unquestionably forms part of customary international
law.33
30
Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, U.S.T.S. 539 [hereinafter Hague IV]. The prohibition on killing treacherously dates back to the Lieber Code, which states that military necessity ―admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy.‖ Lieber Code, supra note 16, art. 16.
31
AP I, supra note 2, art. 37(1). Examples of perfidy in Article 37(1)(a)–(d) include feigning truce or surrender, feigning civilian status, or feigning protected status by using emblems
of the United Nations or neutral states.
32
AP I, supra note 2, art. 37(1) (emphasis added).
33
YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
199 (2004); Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian
Law, 62 A.F.L. REV. 1, 22–3 (2008), (citing to NWP 1–14M, ¶ 12.7); U.S. ARMY JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL‘S SCHOOL, LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 192 (2005); SAN REMO MANUAL
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (1995) (Rule 111); see
also CIHL, supra note 16, 221–26 (Rule 65).
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The Commentary to the Additional Protocols (the ―Commentary‖)
explains that ―[t]he central element of the definition of perfidy is the deliberate claim to legal protection for hostile purposes. The enemy attacks under
cover of the protection accorded by humanitarian law.‖34 Thus, when fighters intentionally disguise themselves as civilians in order to lead soldiers on
the opposing side to believe that they need not take defensive action to
guard against attack, they commit perfidy. The indirect consequence of such
actions is that civilians are placed at greater risk, since soldiers previously
attacked by fighters disguised as civilians may be more likely to view those
who appear to be civilians as dangerous and respond accordingly.
Notwithstanding the nature of Hamas‘s tactics and the combat involved in Operation Cast Lead, the Goldstone Report does not even mention
perfidy in discussing the activities of Hamas and other armed groups, 35 an
unfortunate omission. During Operation Cast Lead, Palestinian armed
groups generally operated in civilian clothes and from civilian areas, enabling them to take advantage of the protections IHL affords civilians. The
Goldstone Report discusses such behavior only in the context of human
shielding, itself a violation of IHL.36 Rather than reprise the debate over
human shields, however, this section will focus on how the report‘s omission of perfidy contributes to the use of lawfare.
The Goldstone Report does state that Palestinian armed groups fired
rockets and mortars from urban areas, citing, for example, a January 2009
interview with three Palestinian militants in which they stated that ―rockets
and mortars were launched in close proximity to homes and alleyways ‗in
the hope that nearby civilians would deter Israel from responding.‘‖37 Similarly, the report recognizes that members of Palestinian armed groups did
not wear uniforms. Instead, after the start of military operations, ―members
of al-Qassam Brigades abandoned military dress and patrolled streets ‗in

34

COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUG 1949, ¶ 1500 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarki & Bruno Zimmerman eds., 1987) [hereinafter PROTOCOL COMMENTARY] (explaining that the ―definition is
based on three elements: inviting the confidence of an adversary, the intent to betray that
confidence (subjective element) and to betray it on a specific point, the existence of the protection afforded by international law applicable in armed conflict (objective element).‖).
35
The word ―perfidy‖ appears three times in the Goldstone Report, all in paragraph 1102,
addressing the alleged practice of Israeli troops urging militants to exit a building because the
ICRC was present. See Goldstone Report, supra note 4, ¶ 1102.
36
See AP I, supra note 2, art. 51(7) (―The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from
military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to
shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the
movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.‖).
37
Goldstone Report, supra note 4, ¶ 450–51.
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civilian clothes.‘‖38 What the report fails to mention, however, is that the
Palestinian militants were not just shielding the mortars from attack, but
were attacking—firing mortars and rockets—while in civilian dress and
while feigning civilian status, the fundamental element of perfidy.39 ―A
combatant who takes part in an attack, or in a military operation preparatory
to an attack, can use camouflage and make himself virtually invisible
against a natural or man-made background, but he may not feign civilian
status and hide amongst a crowd.‖40 Militants who wear civilian dress in
order to launch attacks while benefitting from the protection of apparent
civilian status are thus guilty of perfidy.
The failure to adequately explore what appears to have been the use
of perfidious—and therefore unlawful—tactics, regardless of whether specific situations on the ground actually constituted perfidy once thoroughly
investigated, demonstrates a disregard for the complexities of asymmetrical
warfare. From the soldier‘s perspective, all persons appear to be civilians,
and yet some are acutely dangerous even though dressed like innocent civilians. Recognizing that the soldier‘s obligation to somehow distinguish between this individual and the truly innocent individuals deserving of protection is unwavering under IHL, we must then consider how to improve the
soldier‘s ability to do just that. The Goldstone Report instead effectively
chooses to tell the soldier that the non-state actors can dress like innocent
civilians—thus gaining protection from attack—and attack him while so
disguised—thus granting him no warning or ability to protect himself. By
upending IHL‘s delicate balance between military necessity and humanity,
the Goldstone Report offers those who use lawfare‘s unlawful tactics unwarranted protection from the law. In fact, the report essentially encourages
militants to embed themselves within the civilian population.
At its core, the report‘s acceptance of the militants‘ practice of disguising themselves as civilians suggests that: (1) it also accepts that nonstate parties will fight using perfidious tactics and (2) it believes militaries
and the international community should accept that practice as well. The
true victims of this mistaken approach are the innocent civilians. First, they
are trapped—literally and figuratively—in the conflict zone by fighters using them as shields and as cover for their perfidious tactics. Second, they
become the unintentional and tragic targets of soldiers who mistake them
38

Id., ¶ 478.
See, e.g., Int‘l Humanitarian Law Research Initiative, Legal Aspects of Suicide Attacks
in IHL, MONITORING IHL IN IRAQ (Apr. 6, 2003) IHLRESEARCH.ORG, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20030626085305/www.ihlresearch.org/iraq/feature.php?a=19
(―However, the fact that the attackers in recent suicide operations have posed as civilians and
therefore concealed their combatant status constitutes an act of perfidy prohibited under
IHL.‖).
40
PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 34, ¶ 1507.
39
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for legitimate targets when unable to distinguish between fighters and civilians.
B.

Military Objectives

Beyond the obligation to differentiate between innocent civilians
and persons who are fighting (and therefore can be targeted), the principle
of distinction requires comparable determinations regarding the targeting of
objects. The obligation to target only military objectives is one means of
implementing the age-old principle that the means and methods of warfare
are not unlimited.41 Operation Cast Lead, even more than other asymmetrical conflicts, demonstrated the complexities of determining when buildings
and other objects constitute military objectives. Like insurgents and other
fighters in Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Iraq, Hamas and other armed groups
in Gaza used the civilian infrastructure extensively to hide, store, and launch
rockets, missiles, and other weapons. In any conflict, such conduct makes
targeting decisions extraordinarily difficult given the obligations to minimize civilian casualties and operate within the framework of proportionality.
In densely populated Gaza, the demands and dangers increase exponentially.
Article 52 of Additional Protocol I sets forth the definition of military objectives:
[T]hose objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.42

Nature, location, and use or purpose are the main criteria. Nature refers to
―all objects directly used by the armed forces: weapons, equipment, transports, fortifications, depots, buildings occupied by armed forces, staff head-

41
The modern version of this principle appears in AP I, supra note 2, art. 35; earlier formulations appear in the writings of Vitoria, Grotius, and Vattel, as well as in early codifications of the laws of war. See AP I, supra note 2, art. 35; CIHL supra note 16; FRANCISCUS DE
VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI REFLECTIONES (John Pawley Bate trans., Ocean Publications 1964) (1557); HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 3 (Francis W. Kelsey
trans., Oceana Publications 1964) (1646); EMMERICH DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU
PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE, APPLIQUÉS À LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS
ET DES SOUVERAINS (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institute of Washington 1916)
(1785); FRANCIS LIEBER, LL.D., INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE
UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD, art. 16 (1898); DECLARATION RENOUNCING THE USE, IN TIME OF
WAR, OF EXPLOSIVE PROJECTILES UNDER 400 GRAMMES WEIGHT, preamble, Nov. 29 (Dec.
11), 1868, reprinted in 1 AJIL Supp. 95; THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND, THE LAWS OF WAR ON
LAND, art. 4 (1880 Oxford Manual).
42
AP I, supra note 2, article 52(2).
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quarters, communications centres etc.‖43 Location is an important factor
because certain objects, such as bridges, make a direct contribution to military action regardless of whether they have a military function. Finally, use
and purpose refer respectively to an object‘s present or intended function.
The Commentary explains that many civilian objects are or become useful
to the armed forces. ―Thus, for example, a school or a hotel is a civilian
object, but if . . . used to accommodate troops or headquarters staff, [it will]
become [a] military objective [].‖For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States attacked, among other buildings, the Baath Party
Headquarters, which at first blush appeared to be a civilian object. Yet Iraqi
forces were firing at the U.S. troops from within and near the building, and
a weapons cache was subsequently found inside the facility.44 This episode
shows how actual use is a critical component to understanding whether a
building is a legitimate target. Even though the Protocol emphasizes, importantly, that all doubts as to the civilian or military nature of an object should
be resolved in favor of civilian status, the actual use of a building must be
taken into account in targeting determinations.
The Goldstone Report‘s analysis of Israeli attacks on hospitals and
mosques highlights one key shortcoming in how it assesses military objectives. Like the omission of perfidy, the report‘s errors in assessing military
objectives in this area contribute to the use of lawfare and the corresponding
endangerment of civilians. Normally protected under international law,
these buildings lose their immunity from attack if used for military purposes. For example, Article 18 of the Fourth Geneva Convention sets forth the
obligation to refrain from attacking—and to protect—civilian hospitals.45
Article 19 then states that ―the protection to which civilian hospitals are
entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy.‖46 Launching rockets from or
storing munitions in a hospital clearly qualify. Similarly, Hague Convention
IV recognizes limits on the protection of cultural and religious buildings:
[i]n sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare,
as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable
purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and

43

PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 34, ¶ 2020.
Michael N. Schmitt, Conduct of Hostilities During Operation Iraqi Freedom: An International Humanitarian Law Assessment, 6 Y.B. INT‘L HUMANITARIAN L. 73, 96 n.119 (2003)
(citing U.S. CENT. COMMAND News Release No. 03-03-105, U.S. Marines Destroy Ba’ath
Party Headquarters (Mar. 31, 2003)).
45
GC IV, supra note 2, art. 18 (―Civilian hospitals organized to give care to the wounded
and sick, the infirm and maternity cases, may in no circumstances be the object of attack but
shall at all times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict.‖).
46
Id. art. 19; see also PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 34, ¶ 1948 (―[P]urely civilian
objects may in combat conditions become military objectives.‖).
44
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wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for
military purposes.47

Hamas used hospitals, schools, mosques, residential houses, and
other civilian objects extensively for the storage of weapons, firing of rockets, and other military purposes.48 In fact, Hamas does not have a ―war ministry‖ or many other identifiable military locations—because it deliberately
comingles military and civilian buildings and objects. Conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, among others, also involved similar use of protected objects by insurgents and other fighters.49 During Operation Iraqi
Freedom, for example, human rights organizations condemned the Iraqi
practice of using hospitals and mosques for military uses. Emphasizing that
such use was illegal under IHL, Human Rights Watch‘s report Off Target
explains that the ―protection ceases [when] medical establishments are used
to commit ‗acts harmful to the enemy.‘ By using hospitals as military headquarters, Iraqi forces turned them into military objectives.‖50
The Goldstone Report addresses several examples of Israeli targeting of erstwhile-protected objects. In assessing the Israeli shelling of the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) school, the Goldstone
Report does consider that Palestinian armed groups were firing at Israeli
forces from near the school in determining whether the school, or at least
the area near the school, was a legitimate target. In other cases, however, the
Goldstone Report fails to mention that use of otherwise civilian objects for
military purposes causes such objects to lose their immunity from attack.
For example, the only comments the report makes about the use of mosques
47

See Hague IV, supra note 30, art. 30. See also Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT01-42-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 310, (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2005),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/48ad42092.pdf (stating that ―the protection
accorded to cultural property is lost where such property is used for military purposes.‖).
48
See CORDESMAN, supra note 13, at 43–47, 49, 51–52, 54–55 (describing how Hamas
uses mosques, houses and cemeteries for military operations and to store weapons).
49
See Filkins, supra note 11; Carlotta Gall, Americans Face Rising Threat from Taliban,
INT‘L HERALD TRIBUNE, July 15, 2008; Jeremy Rabkin, The Fantasy World of International
Law: The Criticism of Israel Has Been Disproportionate, WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 21, 2006;
Department of Defense Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (1992),
available at http://www.nduedu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf [hereinafter Gulf War Final Report];
Permanent Rep. of United States of America to the U.N., Letter dated March 5, 1991 from
the Permanent Rep. of United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/22341 (Mar. 8, 1991) (explaining that the Iraqis
―moved significant amounts of military weapons and equipment into civilian areas with the
deliberate purpose of using innocent civilians and their homes as shields against attacks on
legitimate military targets‖ and ―Iraqi fighter and bomber aircraft were dispersed into villages near military airfields where they were parked between civilian houses and even placed
immediately adjacent to important archaeological sites and historic treasures.‖).
50
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OFF TARGET: THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND CIVILIAN
CASUALTIES IN IRAQ 73 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1203.
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to store weapons or as a location from which to launch attacks refer to the
obligation of Palestinian armed groups to refrain from conducting attacks
from civilian buildings.51 It further states that ―it could not exclude that Palestinian armed groups engaged in combat activities in the vicinity of‖ hospitals and other protected sites, nor could it exclude that they may have used
―mosques for military purposes or to shield military activities.‖52 Given that
it claims a lack of the necessary information, it may well be understandable
that the report did not reach definitive conclusions regarding violations of
those obligations. However, the failure to specifically state the law regarding the loss of protected status for civilian objects used for military purposes
is a grave oversight that shows a fundamental failure to assess the law in
light of the nature of combat in Gaza and other asymmetrical conflicts.
More problematic, the impact of the report‘s oversight here is to
suggest—indeed conclude—that attacks on protected objects are still crimes
even if the objects have legitimately lost their protection. Even though the
report makes an attempt at criticizing the unlawful use of protected objects
for military purposes, its concomitant willingness to condemn attacks on
such buildings simply undoes any such criticism and ratifies the militants‘
practices. The effect can only be that insurgents, terrorists, and other militants continue to use protected objects as launching sites, command posts,
and munitions depots, endangering the civilians who frequent such
mosques, hospitals, and schools and depend on the services they provide.
C.

Precautions

In pursuit of the goal of protecting civilians and those hors de combat from unnecessary suffering in war, IHL imposes obligations to take
―constant care‖ during military operations to protect the civilian population.53 Thus, in addition to the rules governing legitimate targets of attack
and methods of warfare, the law mandates that parties take certain precautionary measures to protect civilians. In contemporary conflicts, where
combat takes place in urban areas and civilians in essence live, work, and
play in the combat zone, these precautions are critical to the protection of
civilians during conflict.
The Goldstone Report addresses precautions taken by both Israel
and Palestinian armed groups, with a significantly greater factual and legal
emphasis on the former. In so doing, the report interprets the law in ways
that pose grave consequences for future conflicts, again by encouraging the
use of lawfare tactics. First, the report applies an unduly strict standard for
the obligation to issue advance warning of attacks. Second, the report‘s mi51
52
53

Goldstone Report, supra note 4, ¶ 498.
Id. ¶ 495.
AP I, supra note 2, art. 57(1).
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nimalist standards for the obligations of defending parties to offer protections for their own civilians would, if followed, leave civilian populations
even more vulnerable to the dangers of modern warfare. Both of these
shortcomings in the Goldstone Report enable and exacerbate the use of lawfare and, in so doing, place civilians and civilian objects in greater danger in
the combat zone.
1.

Precautions in attack: effective advance warning

Precautions are, understandably, a critical component of the law‘s
efforts to protect civilians. For this reason, even if a target is legitimate under the laws of war, failure to take precautions can make an attack on that
target unlawful.54 Article 57 of Additional Protocol I sets forth the precautions that attacking parties must take. First, parties must refrain from
launching attacks that violate the principle of proportionality.55 Parties also
must do everything feasible to ensure that targets are military objectives and
must choose the means and methods of attack with the aim of minimizing
incidental civilian losses and damage.56 When choosing between two possible attacks offering similar military advantage, parties must choose the objective that offers the least likely harm to civilians and civilian objects.57
Finally, article 57(2)(c) mandates that ―effective advance warning shall be
given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.‖58 With particular relevance to the conflict in Gaza,
the Commentary emphasizes that these precautions ―will be of greatest importance in urban areas because such areas are most densely populated.‖59
The main purpose of warnings is to give civilians an opportunity to
leave and find a place of greater safety. Article 26 of the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention is the most oft-cited statement of the
obligation to warn: ―[t]he officer in command of an attacking force must,
54
See, e.g., Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 847 (2005), available
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4223422f6.html (holding that a Russian aerial assault on the village of Katyr-Yurt violated the right to life in Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights because the military continued its aerial bombardment of the village and its outskirts even as the civilians tried to leave via a safe passage corridor.) The
Court found no evidence that, although the attack may have been against a legitimate target—insurgents entrenched in the village—―it was planned and executed with the requisite
care for the lives of the civilian population.‖ Id. ¶ 200. Although the ECHR applied the human rights framework and analysis of Article 2(2) of the European Convention rather than
Article 57 of Additional Protocol I, the court‘s analysis is comparable and offers useful information for understanding when the failure to take precautions will make an attack unlawful.
55
AP I, supra note 2, art. 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b).
56
Id. art. 57(2)(a)(i).
57
Id. art. 57(3).
58
Id. art. 57(2)(c).
59
PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 34, ¶ 2190.
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before commencing a bombardment, except in cases of assault, do all in his
power to warn the authorities.‖60 Like Article 57(2)(c) of Additional Protocol I, this requirement provides a practical limitation taking into account the
circumstances and the feasibility of issuing such a warning. In essence, the
obligation to warn is not absolute and can be avoided if issuing a warning
would seriously compromise the chances of success, such as in the case of a
surprise attack.61
Recent international jurisprudence emphasizes that the obligation
extends to those precautions that are feasible in the circumstances, given the
information available to the commanders and military planners. Among
other incidents during the 1999 NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia,
the committee investigating the bombing examined NATO‘s attack on Korisa, a village near Pristina, where 87 civilians, mostly refugees, died when
NATO attacked a Serbian military camp and command post near the village. After examining the pilot‘s efforts to identify the target and the surrounding area, including the identified military characteristics of the vehicles and buildings, the committee accepted NATO‘s position that ―all
practicable precautions were taken‖ and recognizing that the pilot and air
controllers took appropriate steps to identify the target, the committee determined that no violation of the law occurred.62 The Ethiopia-Eritrea
Claims Commission took a similar approach, finding that, ―[b]y ‗feasible,‘
Article 57 means those measures that are practicable or practically possible,
taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time.‖63 IHL contains no
further guidance to help understand what actions make a warning ―effective,‖ but state practice supports the Commentary‘s view that ―[w]arnings
may also have a general character.‖64 Examples in the Commentary include
giving notice by radio of attacks on certain types of facilities or providing a
list of objectives to be attacked.65
60

Hague IV, supra note 30, art. 26.
DINSTEIN, supra note 33, at 126 (―[p]alpably, no absolute certainty can be guaranteed in
the process of ascertaining the military character of an objective selected for attack, but there
is an obligation of due diligence and acting in good faith‖).
62
Int‘l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY], Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, reprinted in 39 INT‘L LEGAL MATERIALS 1257, 1281–82 (2000).
63
Ethiopia v. Eritrea, Western and Eastern Fronts, Ethiopia‘s claims 1 & 3, Partial Award,
¶ 33 (Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission Dec. 19, 2005), http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/
files/FINAL%20ET%20FRONT%20CLAIMS%281%29.pdf.
64
PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 34, ¶ 2225; see also Id.¶ 2224 (giving examples
from WWII of warnings by radio, by pamphlets and by flying low over the objectives to give
civilians time to leave).
65
In the 1991 Gulf War, for example, the U.S. military dropped leaflets to warn before
attacks in Basra, Faw, Zubair, Tannuwa, and Abdul Khasib, among other cities. See C.B.
Shotwell, Economy and Humanity in the Use of Force: A Look at the Aerial Rules of Engagement in the 1991 Gulf War, 4 U.S. A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL. STUD. 15, 36 (1993); see also
61
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The Goldstone Report sets forth several criteria to determine
whether a warning is effective:
[I]t must reach those who are likely to be in danger from the planned attack, it must give them sufficient time to react to the warning, it must
clearly explain what they should do to avoid harm and it must be a credible warning. The warning also has to be clear so that the civilians are not
in doubt that it is indeed addressed to them. As far as possible, warnings
should state the location to be affected and where the civilians should seek
safety. A credible warning means that civilians should be in no doubt that
it is intended to be acted upon.66

Although these criteria may seem reasonable at first glance, in actually applying them, the report diverges from the general understanding of and state
practice regarding warnings in two ways that are particularly problematic in
the arena of lawfare.
First, the report‘s standard for measuring the ―effectiveness‖ of
warnings is unduly high. According to the Israeli Government, and as stated
in the report, Israel‘s warnings consisted of: 165,000 telephone calls,
300,000 warning notes on December 28, 2008 alone, 2,500,000 leaflets
overall, radio broadcasts, and roof-knocking.67 After detailing the content of
the leaflet and radio broadcast warnings, the report concludes that the warnings were not sufficient because Israel had the capability to issue more effective warnings, civilians in Gaza were uncertain about whether and where
to go for safety, and some places of shelter were struck after the warnings
were issued.68 As a simple factual matter, this conclusion that warnings far
exceeding those given in any other conflict are insufficient is patently unreasonable on its face.
In addition, while Israel certainly has capabilities far superior to
those of Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups, IHL applies equally to
CIHL, supra note 16, ¶ 483 (citing United States, Message from the Department of the Army
to the Legal Advisor of the U.S. Army Forces Deployed in the Gulf, 11 January 1991, § 8(I),
in which the United States responded to ICRC queries by stating that ―a warning need not be
specific; it may be a blanket warning, delivered by leaflets and/or radio, advising the civilian
population of an enemy nation to avoid remaining in proximity to military objectives.‖).
Similarly, Israel has used leaflets, telephone calls and radio broadcasts in the past. W. Hays
Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 166 (1990); Emanuel Gross, Use of
Civilians as Human Shields: What Legal and Moral Restrictions Pertain to a War Waged By
a Democratic State Against Terrorism? 16 EMORY INT‘L L. REV. 445, 497 (2002); Suzanne
Goldberg, Israel Launches Rocket Attacks After Frantic Mob Murders Soldiers, THE
GUARDIAN, Oct. 13, 2000, at 1.
66
Goldstone Report, supra note 4, ¶ 528.
67
Id., para. 498–9. Roof-knocking is a new technology the Israelis developed in which
they fire light explosives at rooftops to warn the residents inside of an impending attack. The
explosives merely make a noise and do not explode.
68
Goldstone Report, supra note 4, at 125–33.
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belligerents regardless of capability.69 The wording of Article 57(2)(c)
speaks to feasibility, not capability, and does not require the attacking party
to exhaust all possible means to warn. By qualifying Israel‘s obligations
based on its capabilities, the Goldstone Report exacerbates the alreadypresent tendency towards ―a capabilities-based IHL regime,‖ an approach
that only legitimizes the types of lawfare highlighted in the present article. 70
In fact, IHL is not about a fair fight and condoning the use of lawfare to
―even the playing field‖ only serves to place civilians at greater risk.
The Goldstone Report‘s retrospective analysis of warnings is equally problematic. Although nothing in Article 57(2)(c) of Additional Protocol
I or Article 26 of the Hague Convention suggests that the effectiveness of
warnings should be judged on the basis of whether civilians actually heeded
the warnings or found safety, the Goldstone Report judges the warnings by
looking at whether civilians followed them. 71 Indeed, the law contains no
requirement that the civilian population be able to act on the warnings in
order to find them effective. Rather, the law requires that we examine
whether the warnings generally informed civilians that they were at risk and
should seek shelter.72 In other words, the legal issue is whether they were
effective in transmitting a warning, not whether the civilians actually
heeded them. The sheer numbers involved in Gaza—165,000 phone calls
and 2.5 million leaflets—certainly point to an affirmative answer.
By the Goldstone Report‘s standards—which do not reflect existing
law—states simply will not issue warnings because no warnings will meet
these standards and still enable effective military operations. The effect
would be the exact opposite of what the Goldstone Report purports to
achieve—rather than greater protection for civilians through more effective
warnings, we would be left with conflicts in which states eschew warnings
completely because this (hypothetical for now) standard would simply be
too high to meet, leaving innocent civilians unprotected.

69

See Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law,
in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES (SYMPOSIUM IN HONOUR
OF KNUT IPSEN) 11, 35–36 (Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg & Volker Epping, eds. 2007).
70
Id. at 42–43 (recognizing the danger that ―the more a military is capable of conducting
‗clean‘ warfare, the greater its legal obligations, and the more critical the international community will be of any instance of collateral damage and incidental injury (even when unavoidable).‖).
71
Goldstone Report, supra note 4, at 128–33. In fact, however, the very language of both
provisions, speaking of attacks that ―may affect‖, AP I, art. 57(2)(c), the civilian population,
accounting for ―circumstances‖ or events within the commander‘s ―power‖, Hague IV, art.
26, leads to the conclusion that the law focuses on the content and nature of the warnings at
the time and whether they were reasonable and effective under the circumstances.
72
AP I, supra note 2, art. 57(2)(c); Hague IV, supra note 30, art. 26.
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Defender‘s obligation to take precautions

Although Additional Protocol I emphasizes the attacking party‘s affirmative obligation to take precautions in planning and launching attacks,
this obligation in no way diminishes the defending party‘s obligations.73
Recognizing that the party in control of the territory where the conflict is
taking place is often best situated to protect civilians from the unfortunate
consequences of war, Additional Protocol I places obligations on the defending party as well.74 Article 58, entitled ―Precautions against the effects
of attacks,‖ requires that parties shall, to the extent feasible:
[E]ndeavour to remove the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of military objectives;
(b) avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated
areas; [and] (c) take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian
population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control
against the dangers resulting from military operations.75

Indeed, the Goldstone Report specifically ―emphasize[s] that the
launching of attacks from or in the vicinity of civilian buildings and protected areas are serious violations of the obligation on the armed groups to
take constant care to protect civilians from the inherent dangers created by
military operations.‖76 This statement recognizes what seems apparent from
the wording of Article 57(1) of Additional Protocol I—and is critically important in a conflict like that in Gaza—that the obligation to take ―constant
care‖ applies to the entirety of the civilian populations affected by the conflict and is not limited only to the civilian population of the attacked party.
Parties have an obligation to protect their own civilians from the consequences of their own offensive actions as well as those of the enemy.
In practice, however, the report gives the defending party‘s obligations short shrift. Greater focus on the attacking party‘s obligations in recent
years has led some to argue that the recent shift in emphasis overall from
defender to attacker creates perverse incentives for the defender to use the
civilian population as a shield. They further insist that ―the international
73

See PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 34, ¶ 2191([A]lthough the obligation to take
―constant care‖ appears in Article 57, which addresses the attacking party, the Commentary
suggests that both parties have such an obligation: ―the term ‗military operations‘ should be
understood to mean any movement, manoeuvres, and other activities whatsoever carried out
by the armed forces with a view to combat.‖).
74
See id. ¶ 2240 (―Belligerents may expect their adversaries to conduct themselves [lawfully] and to respect the civilian population, but they themselves must also cooperate by
taking all possible precautions for the benefit of their own population as is in any case in
their own interest.‖).
75
AP I, supra note 2, art. 58.
76
Goldstone Report, supra note 4, ¶ 495.
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community must re-direct its attention and disapproval to those who intentionally place noncombatants in danger to achieve military and political
objectives; if it fails to do so, it serves as an ‗enabler‘ for those who deliberately place civilians at risk.‖77 The Goldstone Report‘s approach does indeed pose this risk.
Paragraph (b) of Article 58, regarding precautions against locating
military objectives in densely populated areas, is particularly relevant to the
conflict in Gaza. Curiously, the Goldstone Report fails to mention Article
58 at all. This approach raises two significant legal problems: first, the obvious failure to address the location of military objectives in densely populated areas; and second, the transmutation of the intent element of human
shielding to potential violations of Article 58(b). The report concludes that
―there are indications that Palestinian armed groups launched rockets from
urban areas.‖78 It neglects to recognize, however, that in this particular conflict, the rocket launchers themselves were military objectives for Israel—
one of the main goals of Operation Cast Lead was to eliminate the ability of
Palestinian armed groups to fire rockets at civilian areas in southern Israel.79
Therefore, when Palestinian armed groups launched rockets from civilian
areas in Gaza, they were locating military objectives in densely populated
areas, in direct violation of Article 58(b) of Additional Protocol I.80
The failure to condemn this violation—indeed to even mention it—
shows the report‘s failure to recognize fully the obligations of the defending
party, especially in the complicated scenarios of contemporary conflicts.
Just as the densely populated nature of Gaza does not relieve Israel of its
obligations to distinguish between civilian and military objectives and take
precautions, so it correspondingly does not relieve Palestinian armed groups
of their obligations under Article 58. For civilians caught in the zone of
combat and for military planners and commanders making targeting determinations, the continued force of this obligation is critical. Unfortunately,
the absence of any mention of this obligation simply gives militants free
rein to exploit the civilian population and the principles of IHL.
As a result of this failure to address Article 58, the Goldstone Report analyzes precautions taken, or not taken, by Hamas and other Palestini77

Richard D. Rosen, Targeting Enemy Forces in the War on Terror: Preserving Civilian
Immunity, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 683, 691–92 (2009).
78
Goldstone Report, supra note 4, ¶ 450.
79
THE OPERATION IN GAZA, supra note 3, ¶ 16.
80
CIHL, supra note 16, at 430 (citing Australia Defence Force Manual, § 553) (In addition, ―the law of armed conflict requires that the defence should be conducted from the position which would cause the least danger to civilians and civilian objects‖). One could also
argue that such attacks violated Article 57(2)(a)(ii) as well, which obligates parties to ―take
all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and
damage to civilian objects.‖ Id.
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an armed groups solely within the framework of the prohibition on shielding. The language of the provisions on shielding does include a measure of
intent—civilians ―shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune
from military operations,‖ and parties shall not direct the movement of civilians ―in order to attempt to shield military objectives.‖81 That intent, however, is only necessary for the purpose of ―finding that a party is using the
civilian population living in the area of the fighting as a human shield,‖82
not for the purpose of finding a violation of Article 58(b)‘s prescription
against locating military objectives in densely populated areas. By applying
the incorrect standard and requiring intent where IHL requires none, the
Goldstone Report identifies no violation of Article 58; rather, it merely
states that it could not ―obtain any direct evidence that [rockets were
launched from urban areas] with the specific intent of shielding the rocket
launchers from counterstrokes by the Israeli armed forces.‖83
Aside from the fact that it is hard to envision what purpose Hamas
could have had other than shielding the rocket launchers from attack, the
report‘s analysis encourages those who wish to take advantage of the civilian population‘s presence. The report thus directly facilitates the manipulation of the law for tactical purposes—if the standard were as stated in the
Goldstone Report, militants could locate rocket launchers and other military
objectives in civilian areas with impunity. Again, the effect is to endanger
civilians rather than protect them. In contrast, Article 58‘s clear prohibition
on locating military objectives in densely populated areas, regardless of
intent, offers much greater protection for civilians than does the Goldstone
Report‘s approach.
III. INTO THE FUTURE: THE EFFECT ON LOAC ADHERENCE AND
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS
Although the term lawfare now often has a wide range of connotations, from the strategic and tactical manipulations highlighted in this article
to civil litigation efforts under the Alien Tort Claims Act to criminal prosecution using universal jurisdiction, the strategic and tactical raise the greatest concerns for the effective implementation and enforcement of IHL. Indeed, in these two arenas, lawfare poses fundamental challenges to two primary and critical goals: protection of civilians during conflict and effective
mission accomplishment. Although IHL recognizes and accounts for civilian deaths and injuries—meaning that the mere fact of harm to civilians
does not connote a violation of the law—the Goldstone Report adopts a
framework in which civilian deaths and the destruction of civilian property
81
82
83

AP I, supra note 2, art 51(7).
Goldstone Report, supra note 4, ¶ 491.
Id. ¶ 480.
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necessarily are violations of the law. The impact of this approach, which is
not reflected in IHL, means that the tactical and strategic goals of lawfare
are rewarded rather than held at bay.
First, the Goldstone Report presents grave risks for the principle of
distinction. Although the report appears to place protection of civilians as its
primary goal, focusing overwhelmingly on the civilian deaths in Gaza, its
application of IHL actually undermines that goal time and again. The general acquiescence in the style of fighting favored by Hamas and other armed
groups—fighting in civilian dress, launching rockets from civilian locations,
storing munitions in hospitals, and so on—has the extraordinarily problematic result of encouraging such behavior both by failing to condemn it and
by misstating the legal responsibility of state forces who respond. In effect,
―[i]t does not take much military savvy as an insurgent leader to figure out
how to take advantage of a legal system where only one side is required to
mark themselves as combatants and the other side has the opportunity to
hide amongst those it is illegal for the uniformed armies to kill.‖84 The result: more civilians at risk, more civilian casualties, and greater destruction
of civilian infrastructure.
If a guerrilla movement were systematically to take advantage of the surprise element that lies in attacking while posing as civilians until – as one
expert said ―a split second before the attack‖ – it would inevitably undermine the presumption, which is vital to maintain, namely that unarmed
persons in civilian dress, do not attack. The result of undermining or eliminating this presumption is bound to have dreadful consequences for the
civilian population.85

The risk to soldiers increases as well, because they are repeatedly forced to
wait an additional second or more to try to identify who is an innocent civilian and who is a legitimate target—but without any way to do so effectively. As soldiers seek to protect innocent civilians by holding their fire, they
continually expose themselves to the risk of perfidious suicide bombers and
other attackers who hide amongst the civilian population. Beyond these
dangers to soldiers and innocent civilians alike, the erosion of distinction‘s
mandate is also ―extremely prejudicial to the chances of serious implementation of the rules of humanitarian law; any tendency to blur the distinction
[between combatants and civilians] must be sanctioned heavily by the inter-

84

Jensen, supra note 14, at 257.
MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 254 (1982). See
also Derek Jinks, Protective Parity and the Laws of War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493,
1497 (2004) (claiming ―regularization‖ of armed forces is crucial for the Hague laws to
function correctly).
85
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national community; otherwise the whole system based on the concept of
distinction will break down.‖86
Second, the strategic ramifications of the use of lawfare are equally
great. Media reports on civilian casualties caused by state forces, whether in
Gaza, Iraq, or Afghanistan, produce an immediate outcry and debates about
the lawfulness of the military operation, the motives of the state forces, and
the potential for criminal liability. In contrast, reports of civilian casualties
caused by militants receive little, if any, attention. For example, there remains a general perception that U.S. forces—and the use of air power in
particular—in Afghanistan are responsible for large numbers of civilian
deaths, notwithstanding documented evidence that civilian casualties caused
by multinational forces are steadily decreasing and casualties caused by the
Taliban are increasing.87 Militants use civilian deaths to their advantage on a
strategic level to undermine support for the military campaign both domestically and internationally. In pursuing their goal of gaining ―political leverage by portraying U.S. forces as insensitive to [IHL] and human rights . . .,
opponents unconstrained by humanitarian ethics now take the strategy to the
next level, that of orchestrating situations that deliberately endanger noncombatants.‖88 Civilians thus become a pawn at the strategic level as well,
because they are used not only for tactical advantage (e.g., shelter) in specific situations, but for broader strategic and political advantage as well.
When investigations into the conduct of hostilities ignore the realities on the ground by ignoring, or condoning, the impact of lawfare on the
tactical level, they greatly reinforce the use of these manipulations at the
strategic level as well. The Goldstone Report‘s conclusions essentially give
these machinations an official imprimatur—the report faults Israel for civilian deaths and finds little or no fault with Hamas and other armed groups
for their violations of the principle of distinction. The only result will be
that non-state forces using these tactics will be emboldened and encouraged
to continue exploiting and endangering the civilian population for their own
purposes, which runs directly counter to the basic principles and goals of
IHL.
The challenges these behaviors pose are vast; the response must be
effective and comprehensive. First, above all, the fundamental principles of
IHL must be respected even in the complexities of modern conflicts and the
blurring of the lines between combatants and civilians. Both the protection
of civilians and effective mission fulfillment depend on adherence to the
86

DIETER FLECK ET AL, THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 201
(1995).
87
UN News Service, Afghan Civilian Death Toll Jumps 31 Percent Due to Insurgent
Attacks, UN NEWS CENTRE (Aug. 10, 2010), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.
asp?NewsID=35575.
88
Dunlap, supra note 1, at 12–13.
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law and its principles. Second, interpretations of the law that encourage or
ratify the use of lawfare must be countered and the existing legal framework
shored up to prevent erosion of key principles such as distinction, proportionality, military necessity, and humanity. Finally, we must seek effective
ways of holding accountable those who engage in human shielding, perfidy,
and other violations of IHL that not only endanger the civilians on the
ground, but contribute to the broader challenges as well.

